

Mieczysław  
Albert Krąpiec

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Publishing Series

## THE POLISH CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

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THE POLISH  
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

# Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec

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MIECZYŚLAW ALBERT  
KRAPIEC OP:  
PERSON AND WORK

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## TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

### The selected works by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec OP

- AFC** “U podstaw rozumienia kultury” [At the Foundations of an Understanding of Culture], in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 15. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1991.
- DEE** *Byt i istota. Św. Tomasza “De ente et essentia.” Przekład i komentarz* [On Being and Essence: St. Thomas’ “De ente et essentia.” Translation and Commentary], pp. 7–47. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994.
- DMB** “Decision – a moral being” [Decyzja – bytem moralnym], *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983), pp. 47–65.
- ETM** “Etyka jako teoria moralności” [Ethics as a Theory of Morality], in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 3, eds. A. Maryniarczyk et al., pp. 284–290. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2002.
- HFL** *Ludzka wolność i jej granice* [Human Freedom and its Limits]. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 2000.
- IM** *I – Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*. Translated by M. Lescoe and others. New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1983. Abridged edition by F.J. Lescoe and R.B. Duncan. New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1985.
- MEE** “Przeżycie moralne a etyka” [The Moral Experience and Ethics], *Znak*, no. 9(135) (1965), pp. 1129–1146.
- Met** *Metaphysics: An Outline of the Theory of Being*. Translated by M. Lescoe, A. Woznicki, Th. Sandok. New York: Mariel Publications, 1991.
- PNL** *Person and Natural Law*. Translated by M. Szymańska. New York: Peter Lang, 1993.
- RHC** “Realizm ludzkiego poznania” [Realism of Human Cognition], in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 2. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1995.
- TAB** “Teoria analogii bytu” [Theory of the Analogy of Being], in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 1. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1993.
- TMM** “Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki” [On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics], in *Dzieła*, vol. 4. Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1994.
- UMB** “O rozumienie bytu moralnego” [Understanding the Moral Being], *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983), pp. 91–102.

### Other abbreviations

- AP** *Roczniki Filozoficzne* [*Annals of Philosophy*].
- EPP** *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej* [*Encyclopedia of Polish Philosophy*], vols. 1–2, ed. A. Maryniarczyk. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2011.
- EWS** *Encyklopedia „białych plam”* [*Encyclopedia of the “White Spots”*], vols. 1–20. Radom: Polskie Wydawnictwo Encyklopedyczne, 2000–2008.
- PTTA** Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu.
- STh** S. Thomae Aquinatis, *Summa theologiae*.
- UEP** *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [*The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*], vols. 1–10, eds. A. Maryniarczyk et al. Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2000–2009.

## LIFE AND SCHOLARLY ACTIVITY

Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec was a philosopher, theologian and renowned humanist, the main figure behind the founding of the Lublin School of Philosophy. He was born on the 25<sup>th</sup> of May 1921 in the village of Berezowica Mała (located in the Zbaraż region of the Tarnopol voivodship, now in Ukraine) and he died on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 2008 in Lublin. In 1931, after four years of elementary school (in his home village), he began his education in the Wincenty Pol Classical Gymnasium in Tarnopol. It was a school where the basis of teaching were classical languages (four years of Ancient Greek, eight years of Latin) as well as reading works by classical authors. In June 1939, after graduating from the gymnasium and passing the final exams (in Polish: *matura*), he joined the Order of the Dominican Fathers in Krakow. There, during the Nazi German occupation, he participated in clandestine academic courses in philosophy and theology at the Dominican Philosophical-Theological College (1940–1945). In June 1945 he was ordained as a priest. He wrote his doctoral dissertation in philosophy entitled *On the Natural Love First and Foremost towards God* in Latin<sup>1</sup> and defended it under the supervision of Fr. Prof. Jacek Woroniecki OP. The defense of this work was confirmed by the Angelicum, the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas in Rome, and he was granted the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. In the years 1946–1948, while already working as a lecturer at the Krakow Dominican Fathers College, he prepared a second doctoral dissertation (also in Latin) in theology: *On Personal Love in the Holy Trinity according to Saint Thomas*

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<sup>1</sup> The original title reads *De naturali amore Dei super omnia in creaturis*.

*Aquinas*<sup>2</sup> (under the supervision of Rev. Prof. Antoni Słodkowski). He defended it in 1948 at the Catholic University of Lublin.<sup>3</sup> In 1951 he started his post-doctoral degree procedure (habilitation) at the philosophical department of the Faculty of Theology at the University of Warsaw. After it was closed down by communist authorities he presented his post-doctoral dissertation *Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu* [*Existential Foundations of the Transcendental Analogy of Being*] at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin and he received the title of associate professor. In 1962 he received the title of university professor and in 1968 he became a full, titular professor.

Krąpiec was connected with the Catholic University of Lublin from 1951. There, at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy, he started his teaching (lectures on metaphysics, the philosophy of God, epistemology) and scholarly work (shaping a vision of philosophy and culture alternative to that of Marxism, based on so-called perennial philosophy as well as “returning” from Augustinism presented by Rev. Pastuszka to Thomism).<sup>4</sup> In that academic community he encountered a number of renowned thinkers (Stefan Świeżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, Stanisław Kamiński, Marian Kurdziałek, Karol Wojtyła), for whom the main purpose of all intellectual activity was discovering the truth about reality and saving it from the Marxist ideology that was being institutionally promoted at the time. The academic cooperation and research unity with a group of professors inspired by the best traditions of classical philosophy (Aristotle, Saint Thomas Aquinas) based on the realistic method of practicing philosophy contributed over the years to the establishment of the so-called Lublin School of Classical Philosophy. The foundation of this school was the realistic trend within 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century neo-scholastics, with its main representatives Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain.

<sup>2</sup> The original title reads *De amore hipostatico in Sanctissima Trinitate secundum St. Thomam Aquinatem*.

<sup>3</sup> The current name of the university is The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

<sup>4</sup> M.A. Krąpiec used the term “perennial philosophy” in reference to realistic-metaphysical philosophy in the Aristotelian-Thomistic current reaching back to the schools at Miletus, Athens, Roman as well as medieval schools. See *Porzucić świat absurdów. Z Mieczysławem A. Krąpcem OP rozmawia ks. Jan Sochoń* (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), pp. 50–51.

Between 1958 and 1961, as well as between 1969 and 1970, Krąpiec held the position of Dean at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy three times at the Catholic University of Lublin, whereas between 1970 and 1983 he was elected to be the rector at that university five times. While holding this position, he prevented the closing down of the Catholic University of Lublin (the communist regime wanted to merge it with the Catholic Theological Academy in Warsaw into one Catholic university) and he contributed to its development, scientific renewal and international recognition.

Krąpiec was a member of many scholarly associations in Poland and abroad, among others of Pontificia Accademia di San Tommaso d'Aquino, Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europea, Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Görres Gesellschaft, Societas Humboldtiana Polonorum, Pontificia Academia Theologica, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, the Learned Society of the Catholic University of Lublin, the Lublin Scientific Society, the Polish Academy of Science, the Polish Academy of Learning, the Polish Philosophical Society. He received doctor honoris causa degrees from the following universities: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto (1989), Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis in Belgium (1990), Ternopil Experimental Institute of Pedagogical Education in Ukraine (1993). He received numerous awards for his outstanding scholarly activities, among others, the Order of Academic Palms from the French Government, the Order of Leopold II (Belgium), the Knight's Cross of Polonia Restituta with a Star, Premio Internazionale Salsomaggiore Parma (Italy), Medal of Merit for the Catholic University of Lublin, the "Polonia Mater Nostra Est" Medal.

The most important works by Krąpiec are: *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [*Realism of Human Cognition*, 1959], *Teoria analogii bytu* [*Theory of the Analogy of Being*, 1959], *Dlaczego zło? Rozważania filozoficzne* [*Why Evil? Philosophical Reflections*, 1962], *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics*, 1962; co-authored with Stanisław Kamiński], *Struktura bytu: Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu* [*Structure of Being: Characteristic Elements of Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's System*, 1963], *Arystoteles a koncepcja substancji: Ogólna teoria i wybór tekstów* [*Aristotle's Conception of Substance: General Theory and an Anthology of Texts*, 1966], *Metafizyka: Zarys podstawowych zagadnień* [*Metaphysics: The Outline of Basic Problems*, 1966], *Ja – człowiek: Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* [*I – Man:*

*An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, 1974], *Człowiek i prawo naturalne* [*Person and Natural Law*, 1975], *Język i świat realny* [*Language and the Real World*, 1985], *Kim jest człowiek?* [*Who is Man?*, 1987], *Człowiek w kulturze* [*Man in Culture*, 1990], *Suverenność... czyja?* [*Sovereignty—Whose?*, 1990], *U podstaw rozumienia kultury* [*At the Foundations of an Understanding of Culture*, 1991], *O rozumienie filozofii* [*Towards the Understanding of Philosophy*, 1991], *Wprowadzenie do filozofii polityki* [*An Introduction to Philosophy of Politics*, 1992], *Wprowadzenie do filozofii* [*An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1992; co-authored with Stanisław Kamiński, Zofia J. Zdybicka and Piotr Jaroszyński], *Odzyskać świat realny* [*Back to the Real World*, 1993], *O ludzką politykę!* [*Toward a Human Politics!*, 1993], *Poznawać czy myśleć: Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej* [*To Cognize or to Think: Problems of Thomistic Epistemology*, 1994], *Psychologia racjonalna* [*Rational Psychology*, 1996], *Ludzka wolność i jej granice* [*Human Freedom and its Limits*, 1997], *O chrześcijańską kulturę* [*Towards the Christian Culture*, 2000]. Above and beyond that he published more than 400 articles, studies, dissertations as well as numerous reviews of post-doctoral and professorial dissertations. He supervised 60 doctors of philosophy and 300 MA graduates. A number of his disciples work in various academic centers in Poland and abroad, continuing or modifying their master's concepts and ideas. The magnificent crowning of his career was initiating the work on publishing the first Polish *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (*Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*). He served as the head of its academic committee and during the last nine years of his life he successfully brought this ten volume oeuvre to completion.<sup>5</sup>

## TOPICS OF INQUIRY

Krąpiec's scholarly interests spanned eight main fields:

- (1) General metaphysics (the questions of the internal structure of being, the cause-and-effect relations between beings and the reasons for pluralism and the analogical unity of the entire existing reality);
- (2) Methodology of metaphysics (the method of distinguishing the object of metaphysics; the construction and the contents of these

<sup>5</sup> Volume 10 (*Supplement*) was published a year after Krąpiec's death.

concepts; issues with proofs and justification as well as types of metaphysical statements; the possibility of axiomatizing and formalizing metaphysics);

(3) Metaphysics of cognition (the object of intellectual cognition and the affirmation of its existence; the rules of the rational cognitive order; the issue of the truthfulness of cognition; analogical-transcendentalist epistemology; the question of truth);

(4) Philosophical anthropology (the issue of the experience of internal human subjectivity and agency as well as the soul organizing the human body; the transcendence of the human subject with regards to nature and society; the interpretation of human cognition, morality and freedom; the theory of personal being; the human being in social relations as well as in the perspective of the fact of death);

(5) Philosophy of law (the human person as a sovereign being and the subject of law; the analysis of natural rights—*ius* and the legislated law—*lex*; the concept of the common good; forms of social life);

(6) Philosophy of politics (the primacy of nature and morality over the order of the state and its effectiveness; the common good as the purpose of politics; the concept of the social being);

(7) Philosophy of culture (analysis of the main domains of culture: cognition, morality, art and religion; the sign character of culture; typology of civilizations; culture as a place where the human being develops, flourishes and is being prepared to a new mode of existence in eternity);

(8) Philosophy of language as a system of signs (the nature of concepts; analysis of judgements; subjective and objective factors of using a language; analogical language).

The characteristic features of Krąpiec's philosophy were: cognitive realism (the object of cognition is the really existing being); maximalism (taking on all of the existentially significant issues); methodological autonomy in relation to the natural sciences and theology; transcendentalism of metaphysical assertions (assertions which relate to the entirety of reality); methodological-epistemological unity (the same method as the one utilized in the objectively practiced philosophical disciplines); consistency (guaranteed by the internal congruency

of the object); objectiveness (achieved thanks to the self-tacking verifiability of assertions which is accomplished by referring them every time to objective obviousness). This consistent program of philosophizing conducted by the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy led to the emergence of a new and original philosophical synthesis which went beyond the hitherto binding historical and scholastic limitations. Thanks to this the school was able to engage in a dialogue with the most important currents of contemporary philosophy (Neo-Positivism, Neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, analytical philosophy, existentialism). Krąpiec himself, on the other hand, formulated a coherent array of views which encompassed with its metaphysical explanations the entirety of reality available to human cognition.



## AN OVERVIEW OF THE ERA

The period in which Krąpiec was active, after World War II, belonged to the most difficult in the history of Poland, also with respect to every-day existence. The war also wreaked havoc in the sphere of culture and scholarship where apart from destroying and plundering goods of material culture their creators or the intelligentsia in general were systematically exterminated. This was the effect of the actions of both occupying powers which combined their forces in their murderous efforts.<sup>6</sup> One can ponder whether those were not the hardest times in the history of Poland in terms of intellectual and cultural circumstances. Ultimately, because of World War II, Poland was pulled into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, which by all possible means propagated in the territories under its jurisdiction a Marxist,<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See A.L. Szcześniak, EWS, s.v. "Akcja AB," vol. 1 (Radom: PWE, 2000), p. 64; A.L. Szcześniak, EWS, s.v. "Katyńska zbrodnia," vol. 9 (Radom: PWE, 2002), pp. 163–182; A.L. Szcześniak, EWS, s.v. "Einsatzgruppen," vol. 5 (Radom: PWE, 2001), pp. 228–235; A.L. Szcześniak, EWS, s.v. "Generalny Plan Wschód," vol. 6 (Radom: PWE, 2001), pp. 293–311; A.L. Szcześniak, EWS, s.v. "Gestapo," vol. 6 (Radom: PWE, 2001), pp. 318–320; M. Trzcińska, EWS, s.v. "KL Warschau," vol. 9 (Radom: PWE, 2002), pp. 208–211.

<sup>7</sup> It was sometimes called communism (See J. Bartyzel, EWS, s.v. "Kommunizm," vol. 9 [Radom: PWE, 2002], pp. 282–295) or Marxism-Leninism due to acknowledging the role of one of the "fathers" of the communist revolution of 1917 in Russia and his contribution to the modification of this ideology and its adaptation to the circumstances of Russia at the time (See S. Kowalczyk, EWS, s.v. "Leninizm," vol. 11 [Radom: PWE, 2003], pp. 55–56; S. Kowalczyk, EWS, s.v. "Marksizm," vol. 11 [Radom: PWE, 2003], pp. 276–282). Analogically, the times since Stalin's power grab in the USSR and the modifications introduced by him, as well as the style of governance was called "Stalinism" (see S. Kowalczyk, UEP,

materialistic,<sup>8</sup> naturalistic<sup>9</sup> and deliberately atheistic<sup>10</sup> ideology with all of the intellectual trends and currents that corresponded with it, such as evolutionism<sup>11</sup> or secularism.<sup>12</sup>

Scholars who survived the desolation of war and opposed the new ideology were removed from their universities, promptly being replaced by appointed lackeys of the system, while the universities themselves were subject to ideological pressures and theological departments were removed from universities. In their place, theological academies under the patronage of the Catholic Church were established, e.g., the Academy of Catholic Theology (ATK) in Warsaw (with the exception of the Christian Theological Academy [ChAT], which was created from the merger of the faculties of Orthodox and Protestant theology at the University of Warsaw). Pre-war scholars from the field of philosophy, who were able to remain at their universities, escaped from the ideology into translational, historical-philosophical or logical-methodological endeavors. The few exceptions were scholars with an international reputation, such as Izydora Dąmbska,<sup>13</sup> Maria and Stanisław Ossowski<sup>14</sup> or to a certain degree Tadeusz Kotarbiński,<sup>15</sup>

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s.v. "Stalin Józef," ed. A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 9 [Lublin: PTTA, 2009], pp. 166–168). Due to the instrumental way of understanding philosophy, this ideology was called "Marxist philosophy."

<sup>8</sup> See A.B. Stępień, EPP, s.v. "Marksistowski materializm," vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 54–64.

<sup>9</sup> See S. Kowalczyk, EWS, s.v. "Naturalizm," vol. 12 (Radom: PWE, 2003), pp. 318–320.

<sup>10</sup> Or even murderously atheistic, taking into account the number of destroyed churches and monasteries (c. 14 thousand) as well as murdered clergymen (ca. 43,000). See A. Zwoliński, EWS, s.v. "Ateizacja," vol. 2 (Radom: PWE, 2000), pp. 53–71; S. Kowalczyk, EWS, s.v. "Ateizm," vol. 2 (Radom: PWE, 2000), pp. 71–78.

<sup>11</sup> See M. Giertych, EWS, s.v. "Ewolucja," "Ewolucjonizm," vol. 6 (Radom: PWE, 2001), pp. 22–34, 34–37.

<sup>12</sup> See P. Mazanka, UEP, s.v. "Sekularyzm," vol. 10 (Lublin: PTTA, 2009), pp. 391–394.

<sup>13</sup> See K. Wójcik, EPP, s.v. "Dąmbska Izydora Helena Maria," vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 277–280.

<sup>14</sup> See T. Biesaga, EPP, s.v. "Ossowska Maria," vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 290–293; B. Wiśniewska-Paź, EPP, s.v. "Ossowski Stanisław," vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 293–297.

<sup>15</sup> See W. Gasparski, EPP, s.v. "Kotarbiński Tadeusz Marian," vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 726–731.

as well as the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden,<sup>16</sup> who was permitted a certain degree of autonomy (until the time, when between 1950 and 1957 he had to leave his university; but then he was allowed to return) and the continuation of his inquiries together with a group of thinkers from his circle at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow.

The regime imposed on Poland by the USSR operated from behind the so-called Iron Curtain, an intellectual and physical barrier whose purpose was to separate the bloc of Soviet-controlled states from any Western influence: whilst primarily political and economic, it was also social and cultural. This led to the almost complete intellectual isolation of the countries of East Central Europe. A significant symptom of that was even the (quite effective) jamming of all foreign radio stations broadcasting in Polish for Poles living under the new political and ideological occupation (a similar situation existed in other occupied countries). All personal contacts, international exchanges and trips abroad as well as visits of guests from Western countries were drastically limited. It was only possible under strict control within the realm of socialist countries, artificially bound with each other by means of the ideology of international socialism. The only exceptions were meticulously selected people, most frequently collaborators of the secret police, who had additional special tasks entrusted to them. All of those who wanted to come to Poland were selected in a similar way. In such a situation, the cultural and intellectual currents existing and emerging in the “free world” played a marginal role, at least during the first twelve years of the regime imposed on Poland. The dominant, forcefully imposed Marxism became the main “ideological opponent” of Polishness and Catholicism. The situation improved slightly after the protests in Poznan in 1956, when a change in power took place and a process of abandoning Stalinism in politics and ideology was started, which was called the “October thaw.” After a decade or so and after the 1970 riots on the Polish coast and the subsequent change of power, further liberalization of social and political life took place and a gradual opening up of contacts with Western Europe and North America was permitted. It was during this period that Krąpiec began his post as the rector at the Catholic

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<sup>16</sup> See Z. Majewska, EPP, s.v. “Ingarden Roman Witold,” vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 524–528; and also P. Duchliński, EPP, s.v. “Fenomenologia polska,” vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 369–378.

University of Lublin and those were the times of the greatest flourishing of the university in its entire, already more than 100 year-long history.

The Catholic University of Lublin was an absolute exception at the time of the post-war “deluge” of the Marxist ideology. In hindsight it was quite remarkable that it was able to function at all. On the one hand, a decisive factor might have been the initial weakness of the communist authorities (out of necessity supported by the USSR’s Red Army and NKVD), but also the uncertainty of how society would accept the communist regime if it were imposed by force. On the other hand, a significant factor was the prewar prominence of the structures of the Catholic Church as well as a strong underground military resistance in the Lublin region aimed at the new authorities, and in fact at a new occupation against which partisans fought for a number of years, conducting numerous actions.<sup>17</sup> Thirdly, most probably propaganda-image factors were decisive: if the new authorities allow a Catholic university to function, then they could not be as bad as their opponents depicted them. The university was reopened already in October 1944 when World War II was still going on and its final results were still uncertain. It was perhaps meant to be one of the arguments to gain favor of Polish society and the outside world, along with other measures, such as initiating cooperation by the new authorities with prewar artists, political activists, intellectuals, senior officers, Home Army soldiers, actors, poets, clergymen and other persons of authority endowed with social prestige.

The Catholic University of Lublin was an elite place which enjoyed the greatest degree of freedom in terms of scholarly activity, despite the limitations resulting from the ruling ideology: the aforementioned

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<sup>17</sup> See “Józef Franczak,” [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Józef\\_Franczak](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Józef_Franczak) (access: 19.11.2019): “On 21 October 1963, 35 functionaries of a ZOMO (paramilitary riot police) unit surrounded a barn in Majdan Kozic Górnych, the village where Franczak was in hiding. They demanded his surrender; Franczak presented himself as a local peasant, but after having been asked about identity documents, he opened fire and was mortally wounded in the ensuing firefight.” Also: “Józef Franczak codename ‘Lalek’ was the last partisan of the anticommunist resistance who fell in combat on Polish territory. He spent 24 years in the underground (1939–1963).” L. Pietrzak, *Zakazana historia. 4* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Penelopa”, 2012), p. 89; See V. Gut, *Józef Franczak ps. „Lalek”. Ostatni partyzant poakowskiego podziemia* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2004).

lack of possibility to travel to Western countries and to host scholars from there, limitations in the access to academic literature and journals, lack of permission to expand the university campus, threats of closing down the university, limited admissions, continuous surveillance by communist secret police etc., not to mention the generally difficult postwar material conditions. Krąpiec, with a group of his closest colleagues at the Faculty of Christian Philosophy (later called the Lublin School of Philosophy),<sup>18</sup> decided to take advantage of the relative autonomy of the Catholic University of Lublin and create a center of scholarly reflection, the achievements of which could oppose the influx of Marxist ideology as well as the dominant tendencies of positivist philosophical thinking beyond the country's borders perceived as a threat to philosophy itself.

The program of action included the development of a realistic philosophy based on Thomism in its variation renewed by Gilson and Maritain (i.e., more faithful to the texts and thoughts of Thomas Aquinas himself). Over time, the term “existential Thomism” was accepted due to its basis in the newly devised theory of existential judgements which cognitively apprehend the fact of the real existence of beings. Krąpiec also significantly contributed to its formulation, since he understood that all the basic domains of philosophy require including this new discovery in them.<sup>19</sup> He successfully accomplished this during the long period of his scholarly activity, as the many volumes of his *Dziela* [Works] testify. Thomistic realism opposed the absolutism of Marxist materialism, considering matter as an important element of things which surround us, but not as the only one. It ascribed a dominant role in being to the act of existence which actualizes the form of being together with its matter to be a real being. On the other hand, by pointing to the fact of the real existence of beings, it opposed phenomenology,<sup>20</sup> that is the current based on the analysis of cognitive data of experience, as well as the developing currents of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language which limited themselves to analyses of structures and the use of language and terms

<sup>18</sup> See A. Maryniarczyk, M.A. Krąpiec, EPP, s.v. “Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna,” vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 894–912.

<sup>19</sup> See A. and D. Gondek, EPP, s.v. “Sąd egzystencjalny w ujęciu Krąpcza,” vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 497–504.

<sup>20</sup> See H. Kiereś, UEP, s.v. “Fenomenologia,” vol. 3 (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), pp. 397–403.

contained within them.<sup>21</sup> A similar danger was posed by structuralism,<sup>22</sup> which though departing from the analyses of linguistic structures, was not limited only to them, but used the analogical method of discovering and identifying adequate structures in other domains of reality, situating itself in the formal aspect similar to formal logic.

The existential understanding of being also guaranteed its objectivism in confrontation with existentialism, which was extremely popular in the West at that time<sup>23</sup> and which was based on variously anthropologically practiced analyses of human existence, as if of necessity, because of the utilized methods (mainly of a phenomenological or hermeneutical nature<sup>24</sup>) descending into subjectivism. The realistic understanding of being based on the experienced fact of the real existence of an entity, apprehended in existential judgments, provided bases for the autonomy of the object of philosophy as an independent one from the constructed objects of particular sciences, but also for using a method of practicing philosophy adjusted to it (so-called decontradictification of the analyzed states of affairs in opposition to the empirical method in the sciences, supplemented by logical-mathematical or statistical analyses), as well as discovering, formulating and justifying claims in philosophy. The autonomy of the object and method enabled fending off positivism (especially logical<sup>25</sup> and neo-) in philosophy, which postulated the use of logical methods (formal logic) in philosophical inquiries and basing them on the particular sciences. This posed the threat of limiting the role of philosophy to the systematization and generalization of the results of various sciences, as well as formulating pseudo-ideological, eclectic visions referring to fragments of reality dependent on them and limited by them instead of a real and ultimate explanation of the true

<sup>21</sup> See M.A. Krąpiec, UEP, s.v. "Filozofia," subchapter: "Postmodernizm," vol. 3 (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), p. 477.

<sup>22</sup> See M.A. Krąpiec, UEP, s.v. "Strukturalizm," vol. 9 (Lublin: PTTA, 2008), pp. 229–234.

<sup>23</sup> See J. Jusiak, UEP, s.v. "Egzystencjalizm," vol. 3 (Lublin: PTTA, 2002), pp. 34–45.

<sup>24</sup> See P. Bytniewski, P. Pasterczyk, UEP, s.v. "Hermeneutyka," vol. 4 (Lublin: PTTA, 2003), pp. 383–391.

<sup>25</sup> See H. Jakuszko, UEP, s.v. "Pozytywizm," vol. 8 (Lublin: PTTA, 2007), pp. 404–412; A. Koterski, UEP, s.v. "Pozytywizm logiczny," vol. 8 (Lublin: PTTA, 2007), pp. 413–417.

reality of persons and things. A similar cognitive minimalism, justified by the effort to maintain the strictness or precision of thinking, characterized the inquiries of Ingarden's school of phenomenology and the Lvov-Warsaw School<sup>26</sup> of logical analysis, which "already at the point of departure closed themselves off to existentially profound human problems."<sup>27</sup>

A very strong emphasis in the research conducted there was placed on historicism and the role of the history of philosophy as an auxiliary field of knowledge for philosophy, treated as a peculiar "laboratory" showing the consequences of various thought experiments, assumptions, intellectual currents as well as their sources and developmental phases. History of philosophy as such is a valuable tool for a philosopher.<sup>28</sup> Another important basis for scholarly activity were logical and methodological inquiries on the methodological status of metaphysics as a fundamental philosophical field of study, the particular branches of metaphysics which spring from it or else are based on it as well as philosophy itself and its relation to the particular sciences and theology. After loosening the iron curtain, so to speak, and reviving contacts with academic centers in the West, deliberations were conducted with the leading academic centers on the methodological status of the particular sciences and the character of the cognition acquired in their realm, the leader in this field being Stanisław Kamiński.<sup>29</sup> Based on these experiences, a stronger methodological self-awareness of realistic philosophy as an autonomous domain of inquiry was shaped, with an object and method independent from the particular sciences.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>26</sup> See J. Woleński, UEP, s.v. "Lwowsko-Warszawska Szkoła," vol. 6 (Lublin: PTTA, 2005), pp. 590–598.

<sup>27</sup> See A. Maryniarczyk, M.A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," p. 896.

<sup>28</sup> See K. Wójcik, "Zarys dziejów historii filozofii na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim," in AP 17, no. 1 (1969), pp. 171–208.

<sup>29</sup> See S. Majdański, A. Lekka-Kowalik, EPP, s.v. "Kamiński Stanisław," vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), pp. 621–626.

<sup>30</sup> See P. Gondek, *Projekt autonomicznej filozofii realistycznej* (Lublin: PTTA; Wydawnictwo KUL, 2015).





## THE CENTRAL CONCEPTS IN HIS PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy for Krąpiec meant rational knowledge, the object of which is being in the general existential aspect, which means that everything that exists, the entire world of real beings, i.e., things, persons, events, facts, processes, in reference to which the Greek question “why” (*diá ti*) something is the way it actually is, remains valid and in the formal order it can be the appropriate object of philosophy. This is a traditional object of philosophical cognition opposed to various forms of subjectivism which reduce philosophy to the analysis of cognitive signs: concepts, the language or data of consciousness. Such an apprehension of the object of philosophy delineates a mode of its explanation which excellently characterizes metaphysics. This is why the basic manner of understanding of philosophy is identifying it fully with metaphysics.

The adequate method for metaphysical philosophy thus understood is metaphysical separation, one which indicates ultimate reasons for understanding being, the negation of which shall result in the rejection of that being. As an autonomous method, separation allows not only to distinguish the object of metaphysics, but also to cognize it deeper in the so-called process of clarification. Its purpose is to reach such factors within an analyzed being, event, fact, process or product, due to which they exist. It is not, therefore, a method parceling the object into parts which are cognized in isolation, but temporarily and theoretically separating specific essential compositional factors for the purpose of better noticing and understanding the entirety of the existing being, occurrence, event or creation.

Separation understood and applied analogically is also the method of a particular metaphysics, and therefore of all realistic philosophy. The result of using it in metaphysical philosophy is a new, existential understanding of being, the understanding of which is the most important task of philosophy. Being is perceived in a variety of ways, but the name “being” itself emphasizes the objective, independent (substantial) mode of understanding real existence. Without referring to the existence (*esse*) of being, one cannot practice philosophy (metaphysics), because it then becomes a mythology or ideology.<sup>31</sup> From this perspective one can notice that the philosophy of the real being is maximalist. It is not limited to some particular fragment of reality, but it pursues an element thanks to which the whole reality is real. That element is the act of existence which, although it is different in every being and individual, it analogically fulfills in every being the same function—it actualizes the content of being. Krąpiec believed that such an approach establishes in philosophy the adequate relation of thinking to cognition, where thinking (logical operations on ideas) belongs rather to the domain of art, while cognition (agreeing cognitive acts with reality which provide its understanding) belongs to philosophy.

If the object of philosophy is the really existing being (in the general existential aspect), then the various particularizations of this being are analyzed by the differentiated particular metaphysics which explain such beings as: the human being (philosophical anthropology); modes of human action (rational psychology; metaphysical psychology); human moral action (ethics); human veridical cognition (theory of knowledge, epistemology); human language (philosophy of language); human productive actions (art); interpersonal relations marked by the obligation to act or to stop acting in a certain way on account of a personal good (philosophy of law), etc. Also nature (animate and inanimate) as well as its various ontic states may be the object of metaphysical explanations. This is possible, because in all of the aforementioned areas of philosophical cognition we apply the same method of metaphysical explanation, we use the same concepts

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<sup>31</sup> See W. Chudy, “Dziedziny badań i wykaz publikacji M.A. Krąpca” in *Wierność rzeczywistości: Księga pamiątkowa z okazji jubileuszu 50-lecia pracy naukowej na KUL o. prof. Mieczysława A. Krąpca*, ed. Z.J. Zdybicka et al. (Lublin: PTTA, 2001), pp. 19–20.

and laws elaborated within metaphysics, and we express the results of our inquiries in an integrated, natural language. This guarantees the unity and congruency of philosophical explanation: i.e., a unified type of philosophizing in which every domain of philosophical cognition concerns only a specifically particularized one and the same object of metaphysics. The differences result from the fact that in the realm of metaphysics we generally analyze the structure of being, while in particular philosophical disciplines we take into consideration important, for specific reasons, domains and aspects of the real being.

In his typology of philosophical disciplines Krapiec did not distinguish philosophy of God (so-called theodicy) as a separate particular metaphysics. He believed that since at the point of departure metaphysics operates only with the experience of the being as a being or a particularized being and neither God, nor the experience of God are available at this point, the issue of the Absolute Being (God) can appear only as an ultimate reason for metaphysical explanation, i.e., as the fulfillment of the rational and ultimate cognition of the world of persons and things. Nevertheless, if in theoretical practice we come across distinguishing the philosophy of God as a metaphysical discipline, it has only a purely didactic purpose.

Krapiec also had his own view on the relation of general and particular metaphysics to the particular sciences (mathematical and natural). He claimed that there is no reason why a metaphysicist should not use the results of adequate sciences, but he should only treat them as an erudite basis (in a negative way) point of departure for the determination of his own object of inquiry. Such a position does not negate the need for an inspiration for a new set of metaphysical issues, or the cognitive value of scientific philosophy (of an epistemological or critical-ontological type). Nonetheless, he rejected the possibility of linking these modes of practicing philosophy methodologically, as well as the irrefutability of philosophies other than metaphysics for natural non-dogmatic philosophizing (that is what meta-philosophy is for). He also strongly emphasized that there is no possibility of replacing the theory of being by scientific philosophies.

Along with general and particular metaphysics, Krapiec also distinguished: history of philosophy, logic, methodology and epistemology, which constitute a group of auxiliary disciplines in the practice

of metaphysics, and he described their status in the categories of meta-philosophical disciplines.<sup>32</sup>

He attributed a special place and task for the history of philosophy as it provides metaphysics with an experience of history which is indispensable for adequately choosing the mode of practicing it. Therefore, the history of philosophy is, in a way, an introduction to metaphysics since it refers to various solutions to philosophical problems which have occurred throughout the ages. It also constitutes a platform for solving epistemological problems and it helps choose the adequate type of metaphysics in which the explanation of the world of persons and things was objectively and historically checked and verified. Apart from that, the history of philosophy guarantees cognitive progress; i.e., discovering novel—philosophically profound—cognitive aspects. Securing the rationality and purposefulness of decisions concerning the present and the future, it shapes a tradition and provides a depository for cognitively significant experiences.

Another important topic for Krąpiec was the relation between metaphysics and logic. He saw all of the problems with adapting contemporary logic to metaphysics in the attempts at reducing metaphysical cognition to a logical-mathematical level. He believed that the tools provided by contemporary logic—due to their construction and structural accessibility—provide cognition of a combinatorial or operationalist sort. And since metaphysical cognition is concretistic, transcendental and based on the analogical language, the tools of contemporary logic are not capable of encompassing and improving metaphysical cognition. Therefore, whoever would completely reduce all argumentative-systematizing reasonings of metaphysics to operations directed exclusively by the rules of logic would not only impoverish metaphysics that way, but also deform it.

## THEORY OF THE ANALOGY OF BEING

An important key to the philosophical cognition of the world of persons and things, according to Krąpiec, is the analogy, to which he

<sup>32</sup> See S. Kamiński, *Dziedziny teorii bytu*, in *Studia z filozofii Boga*, ed. B. Bejze, vol. 3 (Warszawa: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1977), p. 93. The concept of philosophical cognition according to Krąpiec is discussed more in the present book in chapter *Realistic epistemology*.

dedicated his first monograph. In ordinary language we understand it as a “dissimilar similarity.” That is why we speak of analogy when we deal with plurality of things which are basically different, and yet similar in certain aspects. In his works *Teoria analogii bytu* (1959) and *Język i świat realny* (1985) Krąpiec demonstrated that analogy in the realm of philosophy refer mainly to the mode of the way things are and, subsequently, to, the modes of cognition, predication and inferring. And thus he distinguished four main types of analogy: of being, cognition, predication and of inference (*heuresis*). The opposite to the analogy of being is monism (everything is the same), variability (nothing is stable and identical with itself) or isolationism (radical individualism: everything is different). Oppositions for the analogy of cognition (predication) are: univocity (a name has only one referent, e.g., the name “capital of Poland”) or ambiguity (a name has many referents, e.g., “lock”). Krąpiec stressed the fact that ignorance of analogy results in an absence of philosophical culture and most of all in the devastation of the autonomy of philosophical cognition. This fact is most often revealed in methodological monism: i.e. transferring the method of the mathematical and natural sciences to philosophy as the only proper scientific method which necessarily leads to cognitive reductionism.

The basis for the analogy of cognition is the analogy of being. This is the case because things in their beingness are analogical; i.e., despite its multifold complexity each thing also constitutes a (analogical) unity. However, it is not a uniform whole and unity. For example, the human being does not exist as an eye or as an ear, although those are elements of his or her being—and later—he or she also does not exist as an aggregate of diverse elements which would be assigned to some whole. Krąpiec, by expanding this fact to the entirety of reality (which we can cognize), showed that it is not some sort of monolith and that it not a scattered assemblage of completely different things either, but that it creates an analogical whole. That is why he pointed to different types of analogies: intra-ontic, inter-ontic, metaphorical, attributive, and of general as well as transcendental proportionality.

Krąpiec stressed the fact that every being is comprised of numerous components-factors. All of these components-factors, mutually assigned to one another, form one, relationally bound, essential whole of a particular being. Due to the network of real, specific

relations<sup>33</sup> in an existing being this being is prone to various changes and at the same time—despite all of the possible changes—it remains the same thing, identical and relationally equivalent. It is the relational identity of the being, with all its changeability, which is called an intra-ontic analogy in which significant ontic compositions are distinguished, such as: substance–accidents, matter–form, act–potentiality, essence–existence. An important intra-ontic composition in a being is also the relational unity of its corpuscular components, i.e. material composites which are quantifiable and are the basis for research in mathematical and natural sciences. Apart from the being is analogical in itself, it is simultaneously analogical in reference to other real beings, constituting a universe of contingent beings. This occurs, because beings are connected with each other by a countless number of relations which—taken altogether—we call reality, the world, the cosmos—a relational unity and mutual inter-dependence.

This network of intra-ontic and inter-ontic relations is so great, that for some thinkers it veils their analogical expression and it directs the reflection towards a monistic unity and identity. Thus three types of relations are particularly significant for the metaphysical understanding of reality: (1) the actualization of the essence which decides about the factuality of the being; (2) the decipherability of the being for the intellect (the intelligibility of the being), the relation of the intellect to the being, i.e., the truth; (3) the relation of the being to the will-love which constitutes the order of the good and purpose. The consequence of relations occurring in beings and between beings is the analogical character of cognition and the predication connected with it. For human cognition can focus only on some of the properties of real being or on the real relations within the being or else on the concrete relations occurring between all beings. But in our cognition we can also focus on the concrete relations coursing through all beings, i.e. within the entire ontic universe.

That is why the analogy of cognition can occur as: (1) an analogy of metaphor; (2) an analogy of attribution (mutual ordering); or (3) an analogy of general or transcendental proportionality. Krąpiec

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<sup>33</sup> The most interesting and complex issue of relations and their role in the structure of being was described extensively by T. Duma, *Metafizyka relacji* (Lublin: PTTA; Wydawnictwo KUL, 2018), whereas their role in Krąpiec's concept of metaphysics was presented there on pp. 428–430 (transcendental relations) and 581–584 (categorical relations).

noticed that when we transfer a name of one referent to another for which it is not adequate, and in this way we express the similarity in reference to some property, action or effects, then we are dealing with an analogy of metaphor. Since we frequently encounter it in literature, it may seem to go beyond strictly realistic cognition and be an expression of the subjective (experiential) sphere of the human being. In the analogy of attribution to the “chief *analogatum*” (e.g. Adam), on account of a particular property (e.g. healthy) and by principle of efficient, formal, final or material causality, the lesser *analogatum* becomes assigned (e.g., atmosphere, food, sport). In this way, when we understand what the expression “Adam’s health” means, the phrases “healthy atmosphere,” “healthy food,” “healthy sport” acquire a new meaning. Therefore, Adam’s health constitutes a fundamental point of reference for understanding various statements about health. In the analogy of proportionality, thanks to which we can cognize intra- and inter-ontic relations formulating an analogical unity, there are: an analogon (common analogical perfection), an *analogatum* (a concrete being which is the subject of the analogon’s realization) and the relation connecting the analogon and *analogatum* into a whole, which is at once different in relation to every *analogatum*. A good example of this analogy are the following, inter-connected correlates: the human being *John* is in relation with his soul in the same way as animal *X* is in relation with its soul, or plant *Y* is in relation with its soul, where the term “soul” is understood analogically, because the soul is connected to the relation of organizing the body, although this relation is different in every concrete being. When we apprehend general concepts in an analogy, which constitute the essence of a thing, but not the existence of a thing, then the analogy of proportionality is general. However, if we apprehend transcendental concepts (concerning every contingent being) which constitute the being as a being, then the analogy is transcendental. Basically, it can be reduced to three general types of relations: between the essence and existence, being and intellect as well as being and will (of the Absolute or the contingent person being).

Krąpiec stressed the fact that cognition may be articulated and thus passed on and communicated to another person. This is why the analogies of predication and inferencing are important. Analogical inferencing is situated between univocal and ambiguous predication. It may be reduced to: (1) the analogical character of propositional

predicates (general ones, but assigned to a particular concrete entity); (2) the analogical character of the function of predication itself (analogical character of the variously understood propositional “is”). Realizing the fact that predication is analogical, makes it possible to avoid many misunderstandings and leads to the appropriate predication about the real world. The extension of the analogy of predication is the analogy of inferencing thanks to which in the particular sciences we can “guess” new laws and formulate “alleged” principles. According to Krąpiec it is important to be aware that analogy itself is analogical and its general understanding opens the possibility of understanding ontic pluralism and at the same time it demonstrates the necessity of the existence of such a being, which is the ultimate reason for the pluralistic reality. This ultimate reason is the Absolute Being—a being completely free of all the relations that we encounter in contingent beings.

### MAXIMALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM IN PHILOSOPHY

The maximalist strain of metaphysical philosophy is specifically expressed in Krąpiec’s transcendental characteristic of being, cognition and language. The basic cognitive structures of metaphysics within which the cognition of concrete beings as well of the entire existing reality takes place are transcendentals referred to by these abbreviated names: “being,” “thing,” “the one,” “something,” “the true,” “the good,” “beauty.” Since they relate to necessary intra-ontic relations, they demonstrate in what way being exists and they even constitute the criterion of what is a real being and what is not. The transcendentals (*transcendentalia*) may assume the form of linguistic phrases. They then have a propositional structure: i.e., they are abbreviations of existential judgements with an unlimited range of predication.

The transcendentals also reveal the foundations of the rational order verbalized in the metaphysical primal principles, such as: the principle of identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, reason of being, finality and integrality. Their articulation demonstrates the unity of the fundamental logical and ontic laws. This means that the structure of metaphysical cognition is designated by the internal ordering of the mode of existence of beings as well as external causal relations which decide about the ontic dependencies of things. On



account of that, formally metaphysics has the character of a system, the point of departure of which are existential judgements about existing, experienceable concrete beings, and the target point is the judgment about the existence of the Absolute Being (the absolute source of all contingent existence). The remaining contents of the system are filled out by metaphysical assertions connected with each other by logical-transcendental relations.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, *O filozofii* (Lublin: PTTA, 2008); Met; RHC; "Poznawać czy myśleć: Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej," in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 8 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1994); TAB; "Język i świat realny," in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 13 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1995); M.A. Krąpiec, S. Kamiński, "Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki," in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 4 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1994); UEP, s.v. "Analogia," vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2000), pp. 210–220; A. Maryniarczyk, "Przełom w dziejach polskiej filozofii: Koncepcja filozofii metafizycznej Mieczysława A. Krąpca," *Człowiek w Kulturze*, no. 19 (2007), pp. 73–97; *Prawda istnienia: Ku rozumieniu metafizyki M.A. Krąpca OP*, ed. J. Tupikowski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Misjonarzy Klaretynów Palabra, 2009).



## REALISTIC METAPHYSICS

### CONTEXT FOR THE EMERGENCE

The concept of metaphysics elaborated by Krapiec within the Lublin School of Philosophy was a response to the criticism of the discipline on the part of some of the other philosophical currents present in Poland in the 1950s. Criticism towards metaphysics especially came from Marxism, a materialist philosophy that was imposed administratively on Polish academic centers. Also Neo-Positivism was critical, because it propagated a program of minimalist philosophy, lacking full autonomy. It was characterized by the reduction of the description and explanation of the world of persons and things to a narrowly understood way of scientific explanation based on the model of explanation derived from mathematical and natural sciences. There were also other philosophical currents at the time which, although they did not directly attack metaphysics, they nevertheless tried to modernize it, which did not bring the expected effects. And so, for instance, there were attempts to combine realistic philosophy with phenomenology, especially in Roman Ingarden's version. This could not bring the desired results due to different objects of inquiry: in phenomenology these are intentional objects existing in the cognizing subject while in realistic philosophy—really existing beings. Moreover, the attempts to combine realistic philosophy with analytical philosophy turned out to be ineffectual on account of the differing objects of inquiry as well as different methods and cognitive objectives applied. Finally, the attempts to “scientify” realistic philosophy, which appeared in the works of certain logicians, such as, Jan Salamucha, Jan F. Drewnowski

or Józef M. Bocheński, and were aimed at formalizing its language, ended in failure. Krąpiec opposed all of this and with a team of his colleagues he elaborated a commonsensical, precise and justified theory of reality, called realistic, existential or classical metaphysics.

## DEFINING METAPHYSICS

Metaphysics, as well as the entire philosophical program devised by Krąpiec, had two essential features apart from its characteristic realism: (a) historicism, that is an in-depth study of the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, early modern and contemporary) and in particular the return to classical philosophers, i.e. to their original source texts, with the conviction that it is philosophers that have the most to say in and about philosophy<sup>35</sup>; and (b) a reflected, modernized methodological, logical and epistemological awareness, including drawing attention to the very manner in which philosophy is defined and the way philosophical assertions are explained and grounded in argumentation.<sup>36</sup> As he put it:

While we are aware of the fact that human thought undergoes historical progress and that the human being as such is a historical being, we try to draw close attention to the entire history of philosophy, especially those of its periods in which new philosophical currents had emerged. At the same time, being aware of the great multitude of philosophical currents and the diverse ways of practicing philosophy, we place particular emphasis on methodological issues. It turns out that philosophy, in spite of being one of the oldest cognitive domains, still has not elaborated a satisfactory methodology for itself.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>35</sup> “The goal was, therefore, to include an in-depth historical experience of the thoughts of significant philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas, in order to avoid the deformations made by his commentators and later representatives.” See Z.J. Zdybicka, “O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku – Polska Szkoła Filozofii Klasycznej,” *Summarium* 9 (1980), p. 110.

<sup>36</sup> A. Maryniarczyk, “Rola Mieczysława A. Krąpca w Lubelskiej Szkole Filozoficznej,” in *Prawda istnienia. Ku rozumieniu metafizyki M.A. Krąpca OP*, ed. J. Tupikowski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Misjonarzy Klaretynów Palabra, 2009), p. 50; W. Chudy, “Dziedziny badań i wykaz publikacji M.A. Krąpca,” p. 17.

<sup>37</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, “O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej,” in M.A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet*. Selected and edited by A. Wawrzyniak (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1982), p. 249.

The point of departure for the construction of a new metaphysics was the so-called existential understanding of being as an object of philosophy. It was noticed that the act of existence (*esse*) itself constitutes the most important factor in being, maintaining it in the real dimension; without the act of existence all substance (*essentia*) would remain only pure potentiality. Being apprehended in the aspect of existence ensures the realism and objectiveness of cognition as well as the language used by the human being. This existential concept of being was the point of the new concept of being which revealed fundamental differences compared to classical philosophy in the Aristotelian, Scholastic and neo-scholastic versions.

Krąpiec defined metaphysics as the rationally justified and intellectually verifiable cognition of the really existing world (including the affirmation of the Absolute Being), directed at the pursuit of the ultimate reasons of its existence, the traces of which the human intellect discovers in things that are available to empirical experience. Metaphysics is synonymous to the term “philosophy,” understood as the basic scientific discipline delivering knowledge about reality; it is a description of the “first philosophy” formulated by Aristotle, the purpose of which is *theoria*: that is the unveiling, understanding and observing the truth in of itself (*scire propter scire*).<sup>38</sup> Metaphysics, therefore, is such a mode of cognition in which the intellect using universal laws of being and thinking, strives to unveil the primal and only factors, reasons which decontradictify that what exists and what is initially given to us in the empirical intuition of the material world.

The objective of classical metaphysics is to ultimately explain the domain of both unitary (concrete) beings and beings in general, by pointing to the necessary factor which is embedded in them and which would explain both their existence and diversity. It analyzes that what constitutes the essential core of philosophy and what concerns the really existing reality, such as the transcendental properties of being (the thing, unity, the diverse, the true, the good, the beautiful), the structure of being (composition of the being from the act and potentiality, substance and accidents, matter and form, essence and existence) and the causes of being.

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<sup>38</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, A. Maryniarczyk, UEP, s.v. “Metafizyka,” vol. 7 (Lublin: PTTA, 2006), p. 102.

## A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF BEING

Krąpiec emphasized that the character of metaphysics relies entirely on the concept of being, which is its object. The first and fundamental question of metaphysics is the question about being, while its understanding and elaborating its concept is its most important, seminal task. Subsequent assertions in metaphysics are only the consequence of primal assumptions accepted in a justified way. It is worth noting the authors of traditional textbooks and studies were not fully aware of this. In the past, scholars were not fully aware of the concept of being and they did not research it sufficiently.

In order to avoid mistakes while constructing the object of metaphysical inquiries, Krąpiec postulated that the object should meet the conditions deriving from the nature of the philosophical cognition of the world: (1) This object is supposed to concern the real world, that is the one existing transcendentally in relation to the cognizing subject, independently from acts of consciousness; (2) The proper object should encompass the entirety of reality, i.e., it should concern everything that exists; (3) The proper object should be neutrally apprehended, i.e., it should not adjudicate previously determined issues, but enable a steady contact with reality and allow for its objective philosophical interpretation.

In light of these postulates, the object of philosophy is being, i.e., everything that exists, and metaphysics provides the definitive explanation of the structure of reality. The fundamental structures of being constitute the basis for real justifications. It is, therefore, about cognizing reality from the perspective of the ultimate justifications of being and thought and, therefore, philosophically apprehended principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason. It is the classical object of philosophical cognition juxtaposed with various forms of subjectivism which reduce philosophy to the analysis of cognitive signs: concepts, language or data of consciousness.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Ibidem, pp. 106–107.

## DISTINGUISHING THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

Krapiec noticed that:

... for the sake of a new metaphysics one should elaborate such a theory of metaphysical cognition which would, on the one hand, guarantee the realness and the concreteness of the object of metaphysics, and, on the other hand, its generalness, based not on abstraction, but on analogy. Only in such a perspective can one attempt to reconstruct the entirety of metaphysics, describe many of its specific issues, e.g., the theory of the analogy of being itself, the *transcendentalia*, internal and external “reasons” (more precisely: decontradictifying factors) of being, etc.<sup>40</sup>

One is capable of distinguishing the appropriate object of metaphysics, which meets the condition of realness, universalness and generalness, and therefore, of forming the metaphysical understanding (or concept) of being as being and indirectly also all the other transcendental concepts and primal principles of metaphysics connected with them, basing on the special method called metaphysical separation. This method which was outlined already by Aquinas is completely different from Aristotle’s “abstraction,” that later scholastics referred to. Among the activities constituting metaphysical separation one can discern three stages: (1) collecting data of experience; (2) the intellectual analysis of the contents of this data; (3) the intellectual apprehension of this data, i.e., intellectual intuition. The activity of collecting data is the most primal activity in metaphysics. With its aid empirical material is supplied, which constitutes the direct basis for this cognitive operation and through that an empirical basis for the existential version of metaphysics. It consists of the data of ordinary sensual experience. The action of collecting data of experience is determined by the task of the realistic construction of the atheoretical understanding (or else concept) of being.

Empirical data is expressed in the form of existential judgements. They constitute the point of departure for separation. Existential judgments are cognitive acts in which the object’s specific features are not apprehended and, consequently, the attribution of a given

<sup>40</sup> M.A. Krapiec, *O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej*, pp. 251–252.

property is not ascertained to the cognized object, but its existence is apprehended. In the existential judgement “Peter exists” only the existence of Peter is apprehended and ascertained. These sorts of judgments are the most primal cognitive acts contacting the subject with the object which is transcendent in relation to it. These judgements are completely realistic and atheoretical. Chronologically they are first, if one considers them from the aspect of the contact of the cognizing subject with the transcendental reality in relation to it. The redoubling into subject–object is excluded in this case; this can appear only in acts of reflection, whereas the existential judgement is a result of spontaneous pre-reflective cognition.<sup>41</sup>

The second stage of separation is the analysis of the substance of the empirical data which manifest themselves in existential judgements. These are activities which are methodically selected in such a way so as to lead the subject to become aware of what it means to be a being, and thus, to creating such a concept of a being which—when verbalized—could be predicated about every real being. Among these activities particular attention should be drawn to: intellectual reflection on the substance of existential judgements, which are accompanied by such activities as: juxtaposing existential judgements, comparing the substance of existential judgements as well as the intellectual reflection on the substance of existential judgements.

At the third stage of separation, using intellectual intuition, the transition from the categorial apprehensions of entities (of Peter, a tree, etc.) as well as their components (Peter’s “existence” and Peter’s “essence”) to transcendental apprehensions occurs, that is, to such elements within Peter which constitute the existence of “this here concrete Peter,” but also constitute his existence as a being, that is something which is real. Therefore the presence of two “sides” in existing entities is perceived: the existence and a specific essence. The relation between these two sides of being is transcendental, present in every existing being. Omitting one of them leads to the negation of the being. Krąpiec stressed the fact that this moment of separation is a cognitively profound act which decides about the understanding of the really existing being. The reality of the being cannot only be seen in its essence, because there are other beings, the existence of which is not exhausted in one being and one essence.

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<sup>41</sup> Ibidem, pp. 252–253.



Therefore, every being with different ontic content exists in its own way, proportionally to its own essence. Such a cognitive assertion that being a “this here” concrete being, means being an internally determined essence which exists in a way that is proportional to its act of existence, completes the second stage of separation which is described here. Since the subject cognizing a concrete being (e.g. John) already knows that the assertion “John exists” means that John is a being, the existence of which is proportional to its essence, he or she should now consider which elements in the being of John are necessary for him (in order to be John), and which are necessary for him to be a being at all. In other words, at the third stage of metaphysical separation, the cognizing subject should (based on an analogy) recognize the universal properties of being, i.e. in what way does any being exist at all. This recognition takes place in the transition from categorial apprehensions of being to transcendental ones, which point to: the absolute and relational transcendentals of being, metaphysical laws governing the being of entities, internal ontic compositions, as well as the causal way entities exist. We achieve the transcendentalization (universalization) of this apprehension through referring to the analogy in the existence of entities. At this stage of analysis, the understanding of what a being is occurs. It is expressed in a judgement which states that to be a being means to be something substantially determined and existing.<sup>42</sup>

Krąpiec believed that due to metaphysical separation the philosophy of real being (metaphysics) is maximalist. It ultimately explains both the domain of unitary beings (concrete entities) and beings in general. It accomplishes that through pointing to such a necessary factor within it, which simultaneously explains their existence (source of existence) as well as their diversity (ontic pluralism), complexity and contingency, mutual dependency and ontic connections. This necessary element, thanks to which all of reality is real, is the act of existence, which analogically performs the same function in every being: it performs the essence of the being. Such an approach establishes in philosophy the proper relation of thinking to cognition, where thinking (logical operations on ideas) rather belongs to the domain

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<sup>42</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1978), pp. 106–115; E. Morawiec, P. Mazanka, *Metafizyka klasyczna wersji egzystencjalnej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2006), pp. 143–144.

of art and cognition (corresponding cognitive acts with reality, of which it is its understanding) belongs to philosophy.

Metaphysical separation comprehended analogically is also the method of the particular analogical metaphysics and thus of all realistic philosophy. Their differentiation is justified by the function of the act of existence which in every being analogically performs its individual essence. However, since the really existing being comprehended in the general existential aspect is the object of metaphysical philosophy, various particularizations of that being must be dealt with by specific particular metaphysics which explain beings such as: the human being (philosophical anthropology), modes of human action (rational psychology, metaphysical psychology), human moral action (ethics), human veridical cognition (theory of knowledge, epistemology), human language (philosophy of language); human creative acts (art); interpersonal relations marked by the obligation to act or to stop acting in a certain way on account of a personal good (philosophy of law) etc.

Nature (both animate and inanimate) and its various ontic states are also the object of metaphysical explanations. According to Krąpiec this is possible because in each of the areas of philosophical explanation mentioned here we apply the same method of metaphysical explanation, we use the concepts and laws devised within metaphysics and we express their results in a natural, integrated language. This guarantees the unity and congruency of philosophical explanation, i.e., a unified type of philosophizing in which every domain of philosophical cognition concerns only a specifically particularized unitary object of metaphysics. The differences are outlined in the fact that in the realm of metaphysics we generally analyze the structure of being while in particular philosophical disciplines we take into consideration only domains or aspects of the real being which are important for specific reasons.

## THE LANGUAGE OF METAPHYSICS

Krąpiec drew attention to the fact that the language of metaphysics is not an autonomous creation governed by its own autonomous laws and rules which are independent from the structure of the world of things to which it refers us, but its structures are also

grounded in the structure of reality. The language of classical philosophy is characterized by the fact that its constitutive terms and assertions do not have a univocal character, but a transcendental-analogical one. By using the term “transcendental” in reference to language, one would like to say that in some cases the language of classical philosophy goes beyond the generality of the meanings of terms or assertions and becomes a meta-categorical language. Just as the expression “transcendental concept” is derived from the fact that in these concepts the meta-categorical aspects of that what exists are apprehended, regardless of the category they belong to. Such apprehensions are possible only when that which exists is considered in the aspect of its existence. Transcendental cognitive apprehensions, and consequently also linguistic expressions which correspond with them, are juxtaposed with general apprehensions and linguistic phrases. General concepts express contents which are specific only of particular categories of being, from a particular point of view.

The natural consequence of metaphysical inquiries of reality in the aspect of existence is that the acquired cognitive content constituting concepts and judgements is neither univocal, nor ambiguous, but has an analogical character. The analogicity of the language is considered to be something “intermediary” between its univocity and ambiguity. When one says that a given name has an analogical meaning, one wants to say that the content of the name is not identical with the set of features which exist in its various referents. The analogicity of names manifests itself in the act of predication about really existing entities. Names assume an analogical character when they are located in statements and function as predicates. The language of metaphysics which describes the aspect of the existence of the being is analogical by design. The analogicity of the language of classical philosophy is the direct and natural consequence of the existential aspect of inquiries. Hence in metaphysical descriptions there is no place for a univocal manner of predication. The language used in this case does not operate with concepts and names with univocal contents corresponding to them like in the case of particular sciences.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, *O rozumienie filozofii* (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1991), pp. 127–132, 228–229.

## METAPHYSICS AND OTHER DOMAINS OF PHILOSOPHY

Krąpiec drew attention to the unity of classical philosophy which is constituted by general metaphysics and detailed metaphysics among which he included: the philosophy of nature (animate and inanimate), philosophy of the human being, philosophy of morality (individual and economical ethics as well as politics) and the philosophy of culture and art. At the basis of the view which claims the unity of philosophical cognition and treats classical philosophy as one, indivisible field of inquiry, he placed the conviction that the formal object of philosophy—the existential aspect—is common for all divisions within that philosophy. Philosophy has one analogical object (everything which exists), generally apprehended transcendently and analogically, which is explained in general metaphysics.

In principle, the method of explanation is also commonly shared, because in each of the philosophical disciplines, explaining that which is supposed to be explained takes place in the ontic aspect, that is essential or existential. One points at properties which occur in every object of these disciplines on account of their essence or existence as well as because of their reasons for existence and the reasons due to which and for what they do exist. Krąpiec stressed that all philosophical disciplines, as far as the determination of the formal object and type of method is considered, can be reduced to the philosophy of being, i.e., metaphysics. In this concept of the unity of philosophy, even epistemology is a specific sort of metaphysics and placing it beyond the boundaries of metaphysics is groundless. One says that epistemology, if it is supposed to be a philosophical discipline, should have a similar formal object and method of explanation to that of metaphysics.

### SUMMARY

The specificity and originality of metaphysics elaborated by Krąpiec consists of, among others, the following elements:

(1) The objective manner of practicing philosophy which for this reason should be presented as general or detailed metaphysics. The

specificity of the metaphysical approach is the general existential aspect of explaining being.

(2) The practice of metaphysics engages the historicist perspective which allows us to notice the context of the emergence of a given philosophical problem and its historical development.

(3) The analyses of metaphysical disciplines are accompanied by the awareness of the methodological autonomy. The basic method of realistic metaphysics is separation. In order to prove the obviousness of metaphysical assertions, the method of objective explanation (so-called decontradictification) of analyzed facts is used by pointing to such real factors the rejection of which carries with it the negation of those facts.

(4) Including in philosophy of the integral language, i.e., its semantic, syntactic and pragmatic side. It is an analogical and transcendentalizing language due to which it contains and passes on the knowledge about the entirety of reality.

(5) Metaphysical explanation leads to the liberation of human cognition from a variety of a priori categories, thanks to the indication of subjective reasons (causes) for the existence of the analyzed facts; it delivers philosophical tools for interpreting the world and the human being as well as for revealing the bases for the rationality of human cognition and action.

(6) The culmination of Krąpiec's metaphysics is the issue of the Absolute Being. The reference to the analogy of being plays a special role within it, which is based on the similarity of all beings in the aspect of essence and existence. Noticing the analogy of beings allows us to set up a hierarchy of beings and enables replying to the question about the ultimate source of existence, about the being which is the reason for all of reality. The answer is contained in the theory of the Absolute Being which manifests itself as the ultimate reason for the existence of contingent beings.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> A. Maryniarczyk, EPP, s.v. "Metafizyka realistyczna w ujęciu Krąpieca," vol. 2 (Lublin: PTTA, 2011), p. 128.



## REALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

According to Krąpiec, realistic philosophy is directed at cognizing really existing persons and things; it is a rational justifying cognition which points to the ultimate reasons of everything that exists, including human cognition itself. It is a classical concept of philosophy, different from the various forms of subjectivism which reduce philosophy to the analysis of cognitive signs: concepts, the language or data of consciousness.

In response to the critique of neo-scholastic philosophy, Krąpiec with his colleagues from the Lublin School of Philosophy took on the task of not only the formulation of a new concept of being, but also to elaborate a new theory of philosophical cognition, which on the one hand would guarantee the realness and concreteness of the object of philosophy (which he understood generally as metaphysics), and on the other hand, its generalness based not, however, on abstraction, but on analogy. Krąpiec treated human cognition in a new light as a distinct sort of being, justifying that it must be, as such, the object of metaphysical analysis. The reconstruction of metaphysics carried with it, therefore, the reconstruction of epistemology which is most exactly linked with it and which, in fact, should be a specific branch of metaphysics.<sup>45</sup> The purpose of philosophy has been thus subjected to the metaphysical aspect; i.e., the rational, necessary and ultimate explanation of human cognition. That is why epistemology in this perspective can be described as the metaphysics of human cognition

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<sup>45</sup> M.A. Krąpiec, "Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet," in M.A. Krąpiec, *Dzieła*, vol. 12 (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1998), pp. 251–252.

which at the same time is a part of metaphysics of the human being. It analyses cognition as a being of a particular kind, considering its structure, mode of existence and historical conditions. Epistemology thus understood belongs to the domain of general metaphysics.<sup>46</sup>

In his studies *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [*Realism of Human Cognition*, 1959] and *Poznawać czy myśleć: Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej* [*To Cognize or to Think: Problems of Thomistic Epistemology*, 1994], Krąpiec demonstrated that philosophical cognition is based on commonsensical cognition and constitutes its expansion. Thinking about reality or logical operations alone will never grant us knowledge about reality, because the object of logical operations is a mental being which is not a real being, i.e., its analysis never leads us to the real being. On the other hand, commonsensical cognition links us to the existing world. Therefore, the point of departure in philosophy stems from ordinary cognition which is the natural intuition of the real world.

According to Krąpiec—who opposed the idealistic and agnostic positions as well as the radical form of empiricism—the objectives of epistemology, which are convergent with those of metaphysics, are performed due to the assumption of a broad concept of experience. Its foundation is the primal cognitive act which is at the same time (from the metaphysical perspective) the “contact spot” of the human intellect with the existing reality and (from the perspective of the cognizing subject) the undoubtable reason for all cognition. This act was called the “existential judgement.” This judgement ascertains the existence of something *prima facie* and directly, it constitutes the primal (genetically and structurally) cognitive act in the system of metaphysics, performing in it at the same time (as an ontic-cognitive condition) the function of an organizing principle and criterion of justification. According with this theory of absolutely direct experience, the (ontic and epistemic) condition of all cognitive subject-object relations is the spontaneous and pre-reflective act of cognition (accessible only in accompanying reflection, so-called *in actu exercito*), in which no intermediaries of an emotional or sign (*quo* or *quod*) type participate.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> A.B. Stępień, *Wstęp do filozofii* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 2007), p. 68.

<sup>47</sup> W. Chudy, “Dziedziny badań i wykaz publikacji M.A. Krąpca,” pp. 20–21.



This act—being “the human being’s most primal cognitive experience”<sup>48</sup>—is filled in with the factuality (the perspective of being) as well as the affirmation of existence (the perspective of the human intellect) and it does not yet express the redoubling into the subject and object. Only in the subsequent structural phase of cognition a reflection is built upon it, and so are awareness, objective reference, criticism of cognition as well as veracity; the existential judgement itself does not have a veridical characteristic (in the classical understanding), although it constitutes the condition for true cognition.<sup>49</sup> Hence existential judgements are sometimes called “meta-veridical,” because they are more primal than acts of conceptualization. Krapiec observes:

In the description of the concept of realistic cognition we drew attention to the fact that there are acts of direct cognition in which we are not aware of the juxtaposition: subject–object. These, indeed, are the most primal acts in which we experience existence itself. They are expressed in existential judgments which are referenced to in metaphysics. The very fact of existence “grabs us by the throat” in such a way that at that moment there is not yet room for doubt or cognitive distance.<sup>50</sup>

When cognizing/ascertaining the existence of anything in an existential judgement, the human being does so directly and the act of cognition/ascertaining itself is the most primal cognitive experience. The existential judgement contains the essence of that which exists as well as the affirmation of that essence’s existence. At this stage of cognition there is no place yet for doubt or cognitive distance. It is not possible to differentiate here between the subject and object of cognition either. Only at the subsequent phase of metaphysical cognition such acts as: reflection, awareness, subjective reference or the critique of cognition, are built upon the act of the existential judgement. Krapiec distinguished two types of direct existential judgements: an existential judgement ascertaining the existence of a being external in comparison with the cognizing subject (“something is/exists”) and an existential judgement reflective in relation to the subject

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<sup>48</sup> TMM, p. 194.

<sup>49</sup> W. Chudy, “Dziedziny badań i wykaz publikacji M.A. Krapca,” pp. 20–21.

<sup>50</sup> M.A. Krapiec, “Filozofia i filozofie,” in M.A. Krapiec, *Dzieta*, vol. 12 (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1998), p. 253.

(“I am/exist”). The first one is the foundation of metaphysical and epistemic realism as well as the objectivity of philosophy, and both of them are the (ontic and epistemic) condition of the cognitive relation subject–object.

Among the methods of realistic cognition available, the types of reasoning known to contemporary methodology of science are present; nevertheless, one always deals here with a specific type of cognition which does not fit fully into the disjunctive formal classifications. The return to the Thomistic understanding of separation and its clarification were very important for Krąpiec’s concept of cognition, because this makes it possible to extract the understanding of being and to cognize it within the so-called process of clarification. The point of metaphysical separation is reaching such factors of beings (an analyzed event, fact, process or creation) due to which they exist. Separation understood analogically is also the method of particular metaphysics and, therefore, of entire realistic philosophy.

The method of justifying assertions in philosophy which was devised by Krąpiec and Kamiński, is the intuitive-reductive method. It was developed in opposition to the deductive methods used in the exact sciences and to attempts at construing metaphysics like a deductive system. The analogical character of being and cognition limits the application of univocal methods in objective cognition, including deduction. The reductive method in metaphysics is a specific form of cognitive decontradictification; i.e., indicating in the being itself such an element, the negation of which would result in negating the very fact subject to explanation. The culmination point is the ultimate explanation of all beings in the light of the deepest factor which constitutes them.

Krąpiec broadly described the theory of the analogy of being which stands at the basis of metaphysical assertions. The analogy of being, both intra- and inter-ontic, which is present in the entirety of reality, is to some extent the source of the validity of metaphysical assertions, providing them with a reliable foundation. The culmination of metaphysical considerations, on the other hand, is ontic participation. It is a method which explains not only the causal relations of beings with the Absolute Being, but it also highlights the complexity of being and the exceptional character of the existence of being. The theory of participation which was broadly discussed by Zdybicka and supplemented by Maryniarczyk, also stresses the

prudential character of philosophy, because it shows the deepest reasons for the existence of the world.<sup>51</sup>

When discussing methods of philosophical cognition according to Krąpiec it is worth mentioning the role of logic, which is comprehended in this case as a theory of improving cognition, as opposed to improving thinking. However, the tools with which contemporary logic operates are not capable of apprehending and improving metaphysical cognition which is a concretist and transcendental cognition, expressed in analogical language. This sort of cognition cannot be reduced to combinatorial or operationist cognition.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> T. Mioduszewski, *Spór o realizm w lubelskiej szkole filozoficznej* (Ząbki: Apostolicum. Wydawnictwo Księży Pallotynów Prowincji Chrystusa Króla, 2013), p. 197.

<sup>52</sup> A. Maryniarczyk, M.A. Krąpiec, s.v. "Lubelska Szkoła Filozoficzna," p. 901.